Since the 1980s, legal scholars and judges routinely rely upon various tools of economic analysis to assess wide-ranging legal doctrines, lawmaking processes, and institutions. Familiarity with such tools is often critical to effective advocacy. This course provides a rich introductory survey of Law and Economics.

Many introductory courses focus predominantly on neoclassical economic analysis of the common law. This course takes a broader view with respect to relevant analytical tools and their applications. Beyond neoclassical analysis, we will evaluate interest group theory, game theory, and social choice, and consider the implications of these methodologies for a variety of topics in private and public law.

The course begins with a predominantly non-mathematical introduction to price theory as the basis for a survey of the common law doctrines Tort, Contract, and Property, with extensions to Criminal Law and the Judicial Process. We then consider tools drawn from interest group theory, social choice theory, and elementary game theory as they relate to a broad range of public law doctrines and lawmaking institutions. This course thus provides a valuable capstone that integrates learning from the 1L and upper curricula, grounded in a set of methodologies that allow for cross cutting connections and thus a deeper understanding.

Although this course is designed for students with no prior exposure to economics, students who have a background are most welcome. The only prerequisites are a curious mind and a willingness to challenge conventional thinking. I will present and explain all concepts in a manner accessible to all law students, and thus with minimal math.

Students will be evaluated based on class participation, short reaction papers, and a final exam. I also allow up to five second-year students to use this course to fulfill their advanced writing requirement in lieu of the exam. The coursebook is Stearns, Zywicki, and Miceli, Law and Economics: Private and Public (2018).